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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAYTON CITY, ) 
) BRIEF OF 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ) PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE 
vs. ) Case No. 950293-CA 
KENNETH KEMP, ) Category 2 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OR PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant, Kenneth Kemp, appeals from his conviction of interference with a public 
servant in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 (1993). This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) and (f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did defendant waive the issue of the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
801, by failing to preserve the issue before the Trial Court? 
"As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including a constitutional 
argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the 
case involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359, (Utah App. 1993) 
(citations omitted). See also. State v. Archambeau. 820 P. 2d 920,922 (Utah App. 1991) (court 
declined to reach the merits of a constitutional challenge of a statue because the defendant failed 
to raise the issue before the trial court.). 
2. Was Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 unconstitutionally applied to the defendant? 
A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law that is reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Davis. 787 P. 2d 517, 519 (Utah App. 1990). 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
committed the offense of interference with a public servant in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
8-301? 
When a defendant challenges a jury verdict, this court reviews "the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict." 
State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1012 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 
236 (Utah 1992)). See also State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 38 (Utah 1989), cert, denied 493 
U.S. 814, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). 
4. Did the Trial Court commit plain error in failing to define the term "intimidation" 
in the jury instructions? 
"This court reviews the Trial Court's jury instructions on elements of a crime under a 
correctness standard. State v. Stevenson, 884 P. 2d 1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994), cert denied, 
892 P. 2d 13 (Utah 1995). However, jury instructions to which a party failed to object at trial 
will not be reviewed absent of showing of manifest injustice." State v. Gibson. 908 P. 2d 352 
(Utah App. 1995), Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) (other citations omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 7, 1994, Layton City filed an information charging Kenneth Kemp, 
defendant/appellant with interference with a public servant on May 12, 1994, under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-301 (1993). (R. 6 -7). A jury trial was held March 30,1995. 
At trial, Layton City called two witnesses, Davis County Constable Brent Johnstun 
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(R.186) and Layton City Police Sergeant Dale May. (R.265). On May 12, 1994, Johnstun went 
to the home of Gretchen Graehl in Layton to serve a Praecipe and Writ of Execution and a Bench 
Warrant for Graehl's arrest. (R.194-197). Johnstun was wearing a Constable's uniform (R. 205), 
and identified himself. (R. 206). As Johnstun was attempting to explain the paperwork to Graehl 
in the driveway of her home, he was interrupted by the defendant. (R. 201). Defendant 
approached, stepped in between Johnstun and Graehl (R.203), and asked Johnstun what was 
going on. (R.201). Johnstun explained to defendant that he needed to talk to Graehl about the 
papers he was serving on her, (R. 201). Defendant became upset and argued with Johnstun in a 
loud voice. (R. 257, 278-279). Defendant said to Johnstun, "no, you will talk to me." (R. 202). 
Defendant also stated, "you don't have any power to be here, you don't even have a right to be 
on my property." (R. 202). When Johnstun asked defendant to step aside so he could speak with 
Graehl, defendant refused and stated, "Gretchen you don't have to talk to him, you don't have to 
do anything he says." (R. 203). Defendant told Johnstun that he had no authority to be there, had 
no authority to give Graehl the papers, that Johnstun was not taking anything, and that Johnstun 
was to deal directly with defendant and not with Graehl. (R. 207). During this conversation 
defendant continued to stand between Johnstun and Graehl. (R. 236). Before defendant 
approached Graehl and Johnstun, Johnstun was standing three to four feet away from Graehl. (R. 
256). When defendant stepped between Johnstun and Graehl, defendant was one to one and a 
half feet away from Johnstun. (R. 256). 
The above described conduct by defendant made it impossible for Johnstun to continue 
explaining the paperwork that he needed to serve on Graehl. (R.203). Johnstun felt threatened by 
defendant's conduct (R.203), and would not have been able to execute the bench warrant without 
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the assistance of a Layton City police officer. (R. 205). Shortly after Johnstun's arrival at the 
residence, Sergeant Dale May of the Layton City Police Department arrived (R. 208) in response 
to an earlier request by Johnstun to Layton City to have a police officer assist him with the 
service of the papers. (R. 198). May took defendant ten to fifteen feet away from Johnstun and 
Graehl so Johnstun could continue serving the papers on Graehl. (R.208). 
When May arrived at the Graehl residence he observed defendant angrily arguing with 
Johnstun in the driveway of the residence. (R.267). May observed that the defendant was in 
between Graehl and Johnstun and " in Mr. Johnstun's face," (R. 274). He observed that Johnstun 
and defendant were so close to one another that they could have touched. (R. 279). Defendant 
told May that the defendant did not have to talk to Johnstun and that he did not have to do what 
Johnstun said. (R. 274). 
At the conclusion of the City's case, defendant made a Motion to Dismiss. (R. 339). 
Defendant argued that the evidence presented by the City was insufficient to support a finding of 
guilt if the Court interpreted the statute under which the defendant was charged in a 
constitutional manner. (R. 339-342). 
The court denied defendant's motion in an Amended Memorandum of Decision issued 
April 7,1995. (R. 132-133). At the conclusion of the trial, the court issued a number of 
instructions to the jury. (R. 111-127). Some of the Court's verbal instructions to the jury were 
omitted from the transcript. (R. 354). However, the instructions were given to the jury in 
writing as well and are included in the record. Three of the instructions read as follows: 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
DEFINITION AND ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE 
Before you can find the defendant guilty of interference with a public servant, you 
must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That the defendant used intimidation or engaged in some other unlawful act, 
2. That he did so with a purpose to interfere with a public servant, 
3. That the public servant was performing or purporting to perform an official 
function, and 
4. That the defendant's act occurred in Layton, Utah, on or about May 12, 1994. 
If you believe that the evidence has established each and all of the above elements 
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant 
guilty. On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to establish one or more of 
the above elements, then you should find the defendant not guilty. (R. 115). 
INSTRUCTION NO. JL 
DEFINITION OF INTERFERENCE WITH A PUBLIC SERVANT 
A person is guilty of interference with a public servant if he uses force, violence, 
intimidation, or engages in any other unlawful act with a purpose to prevent the 
public servant from performing an official function. (R. 116). 
INSTRUCTION NO. X 
BEHAVIOR TOWARD A PUBLIC SERVANT 
You are instructed that under the laws of the State of Utah, in order to find that the 
defendant, Kenneth Kemp, used intimidation with the purpose to interfere with a 
public servant, you must find that he did more than remonstrate or criticize the 
public servant. Interrupting or distracting a public servant, without more, are 
insufficient to justify a finding that a person has used intimidation with a purpose 
to interfere. 
A person is said to remonstrate when he earnestly presents reasons of 
opposition or grievance. (R. 117). 
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The Court asked counsel if there were any objections to the instructions. (R. 375). In 
response the court's question, defendant's counsel, Mr. Bradshaw stated, "No exceptions, your 
honor." (R. 375). Defendant never requested an instruction defining the term "intimidation". 
The jury found defendant guilty of interference with a public servant. (R. 376). 
Defendant subsequently filed this appeal (R. 134-135). In his docketing statement, defendant 
raised two issues for the appeal: 
"a. The jury verdict was not supported by the evidence, 
b. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss." 
On May 17,1995, this Court filed a Sea Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition. 
Defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Disposition asserting 
additional grounds for his appeal. On October 6,1995, this court filed an order denying the 
Motion for Summary Disposition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's failure to raise the issue of whether Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 is 
unconstitutional constitutes a waiver which precludes the Court's consideration of the issue on 
appeal. Defendant's motion to dismiss presented to the trial court, addressed only the merits of 
the case, and not the constitutionality of the statute. 
The application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 to convict defendant was constitutional 
because defendant engaged in more than constitutionally protected speech. Testimony at trial 
established that defendant engaged in physical and verbal conduct with the purpose of 
intimidating and interfering with a public servant who was attempting to perform an official 
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function. While a constable was attempting to serve legal documents on another person, 
defendant loudly argued with the constable, questioned the constable's authority, and placed 
himself in a threatening and intimidating position in front of the constable. As a result of 
defendant's conduct, the constable was unable to perform his duties. 
Taken in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence presented at trial was 
sufficient to prove that defendant committed the crime of Interference with a Public Servant in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 (1993). 
The trial court did not commit plain error in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of 
"intimidation". "Intimidation" is a term of common usage and need not be explicitly defined in 
order for the average juror to understand the meaning of the term. Moreover, the jury's 
instructions, taken as a whole, adequately portrayed to the jury that verbal exchanges alone were 
not enough to establish the offense. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO ARGUE THAT UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-8-301 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE HE FAILED TO RAISE THE 
ISSUE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. 
Defendant raises the issue of the unconstitutionality of the interference with a public 
servant statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301, for the first time on appeal. By not preserving this 
issue at the Trial Court level the defendant waives his right to argue it before the Court of 
Appeals. State v. Brown. 856 P. 2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993). 
At the close of the plaintiffs case at the trial, defendant moved the court to dismiss the 
charge of interfering with a public servant. (R. 339). Defendant's argument went to the 
sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution. Specifically, defendant argued that if 
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the court interpreted the statute in a constitutional manner, there was insufficient evidence to 
establish a prima facie case. (R. 342). Defendant never addressed the statute nor explained how 
it was unconstitutional. 
A defendant is precluded from raising a constitutional issue on appeal if he failed to raise 
the issue before the trial court. State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah App. 1991). This 
Court will make an exception only when the defendant demonstrates "plain error" or 
"exceptional circumstances." Id. In this case defendant never asked the trial court to rule on the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. 76-8-301. Furthermore, defendant does not explain why 
this court should find plain error nor does he identify any exceptional circumstances that would 
justify this Court's consideration of the issue on appeal. 
II. THE APPLICATION OF § 76-8-301 TO DEFENDANT WAS 
CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Defendant argues that he was engaging in constitutionally protected conduct on May 12, 
1994, when he engaged in the altercation with Johnstun. Defendant asserts that to punish him for 
the conduct upon which the charge of interference with a public servant was brought, would 
violate his right to free speech. 
In this case, the evidence demonstrated that defendant engaged in more than just speech 
to constitute his interference with a public servant. Specifically, defendant engaged in both 
verbal and physical conduct with a purpose to intimidate Johnstun and interfere with Johnstun's 
attempt to serve legal documents on Graehl. As Johnstun was attempting to explain the Praecipe 
and Writ of Execution and Bench Warrant to Graehl, defendant approached Johnstun and stepped 
in between Johnstun and Graehl. (R. 203). At this time defendant was one to one and a half feet 
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away from Johnstun. (R. 256). Defendant argued loudly with Johnstun and questioned 
Johnstun's authority to be there. (R. 207). Defendant further told Graehl that she did not need to 
speak with Johnstun and told Johnstun that he was to deal directly with defendant. (R.207). 
During the entire exchange defendant was standing directly in front of Johnstun and between 
Johnstun and Graehl. (R. 236). During the incident Johnstun felt threatened by defendant (R. 
203), and was unable to perform the service of the papers. (R. 203). Finally Johnstun was 
required to engage the assistance of a Layton City Police Officer to be able to execute the papers. 
(R. 205). There was other testimony at the trial that defendant was "in Johnstun's face" (R. 274), 
and that he was so close to Johnstun that the two could have been touching. (R. 279). 
In this case there was substantial evidence that defendant was engaging in more than 
constitutionally protected free speech. In this case the evidence showed that defendant engaged 
in both verbal and physical acts that together constituted intimidation of a constable and that 
interfered with the constable's performance of his duties. Defendant's actions of placing himself 
in between Johnstun and Graehl and placing himself so close to Johnstun that Johnstun felt 
threatened, together with defendant's heated and loud verbal exchange with Johnstun constitute 
the violation of the statute as the defendant's conduct prevented Johnstun from explaining to, and 
serving papers upon, Graehl. This conduct is not protected by the constitution. 
III. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE JURY TO 
ESTABLISH DEFENDANT'S GUILT WITHOUT A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
When a defendant challenges a jury verdict, this court reviews "the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict." 
State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1012 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 
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236 (Utah 1992); State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 38 (Utah 1989), cert, denied 493 U.S. 814, 110 
S.Ct. 62 (1989). This Court has stated that it will reverse a jury verdict "only when the evidence, 
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." State v. Scheel. 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted); State v. 
Wright. 893 P. 2d 1113,117 (Utah App. 1995). 
This court has also stated ""[w]e do not weigh conflicting evidence, nor do we substitute 
our own judgment on the credibility of witnesses for that of the j u r y ' . . . Moreover, 'the 
existence of contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences does not warrant disturbing the 
jury's verdict.'" Id (citations omitted^: see also Penrod v. Carter. 737 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987) 
(stating that "[ajlthough the issues are the subject of conflicting testimony at trial, this Court does 
not overturn a jury's verdict so long as there is ample record evidence to support the jury's 
finding.") and Morgan v. Ouailbrook Condominium Co.. 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). 
A person is guilty of interfering with a public servant "if he uses force, violence, 
intimidation, or engages in any other unlawful act with a purpose to interfere with a public 
servant performing or purporting to perform an official function." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301 
(1993). There was substantial testimony at trial to establish that the defendant engaged in 
physical and verbal conduct with the purpose of intimidating and interfering with a public 
servant who was attempting to perform an official function. The specific testimony presented at 
trial identifying defendant's unlawful conduct is outlined above in Part II of the Argument 
section of this brief. There was some conflicting testimony offered by the defendant and Graehl. 
The jury received instructions on the elements of the offense of interfering with a public servant. 
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The jury was also instructed that to convict defendant they must find that he did more than 
remonstrate, criticize, interrupt or distract the public servant. (R.l 17). After hearing all the 
evidence presented, it is the right and the duty of the jury to weigh the credibility of the evidence 
and reach its own conclusion. See, State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Utah 1989) (stating 
that choosing between conflicting testimony is "within the province of the jury.") (citing State v. 
Gentry. 747 P.2d 1032, 1039 (Utah 1987)). 
Moreover, in its Memorandum of Decision on defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the trial 
court noted: 
In this case there was more than name calling; it went beyond the verbal. Had 
defendant stayed aside and expressed his criticism of what the constable was 
doing we would have another scenario entirely . . . It was his physical 
interference, his repeated placing of himself between the constable and the 
defendant's girlfriend and his making statements which could reasonably be taken 
as threatening that constituted interference. 
If four jurors and a judge found the evidence sufficient to convict him, defendant cannot establish 
that reasonable minds would have a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime. 
IV. IT WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FAIL TO 
INCLUDE A DEFINITION OF INTIMIDATION IN THE JURY INSTRUCTION 
Appellant's final claim on appeal is that it was plain error for the trial court to fail to 
specifically define "intimidation" in the jury instructions. Defendant did not object to 
instructions numbered six through eight, nor did he offer his own instruction defining 
"intimidation" at trial. (R. 375). This court "may review jury instructions or the lack thereof for 
error in the absence of an objection only 'to avoid a manifest injustice.'" State v. Powell. 872 
P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1994); citing Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c) and State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 
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121-22 (Utah 1989). 
When instructions six through eight are read together, the meaning of the statute and what 
was required by the term "intimidation" is clear. "Intimidation" is a term of common 
understanding. The jury did not need an instruction defining the term. Further, Instructions six 
through eight make clear that mere verbal communication is not enough to constitute a violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301. Mere verbal communication without more would be protected 
by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. But, physical actions in conjunction 
with verbal communication that interferes with a public servant attempting to perform an official 
function, is not protected conduct. Instructions six through eight provide sufficient definition 
and instruction to any reasonable juror that "intimidation" cannot be established through the 
mere utterance of words. The jury was instructed that physical conduct was necessary to violate 
the statute. The jurors did not apply incorrect law to the facts of the case and it is unlikely that 
with a more precise definition of "intimidation" that a jury would have returned a different 
verdict. The instructions were clear, the jury understood them and they properly convicted 
defendant of interference with a public servant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should affirm the conviction of the 
defendant for interfering with a public servant in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-301. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Q day of. 
1996. 
IhCAM lA^r-" 
SUSAN L. 
LAYTON CITY PROSECUTOR 
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ADDENDUM 
76-8-301 CRIMINAL CODE 
or other writings appertaining or belonging to his office or mutilates or 
destroys or takes away the same. 
(2) Unofficial misconduct is a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-203, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-203. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Officers § 255 et seq. 
Officers and Employees § 407. Key Numbers. — Officers «=» 121. 
PART 3 
OBSTRUCTING GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS 
76-8-301. Interference with public servant. 
(1) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he uses force, violence, 
intimidation, or engages in any other unlawful act with a purpose to interfere 
with a public servant performing or purporting to perform an official function. 
(2) For purposes of this section, "public servant" does not include jurors. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-301, enacted by L. ment, effective May 3, 1993, added the (1) 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-301; 1993, ch. 42, § 3. designation and added Subsection (2). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS his duty. State v. Sandman, 4 Utah 2d 69, 286 
. . ,. P.2d 1060 (1955). 
Constitutionality. 
Game wardens. Interference. 
Interference. Employer who refused to bring employee out 
Official function. of factory so that deputy sheriff could serve her 
with small claims court order was not obstruct-
Constitutionality. [ng officer in performing his duty where em-
This section is not unconstitutionally vague. ployer had no objections to service during vari-
State v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 50 (Utah 1982).
 0us work breaks, but not during working hours, 
Game wardens. since particular manufacturing process became dangerous if work was impeded. State v. 
Game wardens were by law peace officers
 L u d l o w > 28 Utah 2d 434, 503 P.2d 1210 (1972)! 
who had same power and followed same proce-
dure in making arrests as other peace officers. Official function. 
State v. Sandman, 4 Utah 2d 69, 286 P.2d 1060 University security officer who arrested stu-
(1955). t dent in area where sole interests of university 
Defendant's refusal to permit game warden were location of fraternity and religious insti-
to inspect his bait and subsequent disposal of tute for students was not discharging, or at-
bait amounted to obstruction or resistance of tempting to discharge, any duty of his office, 
officer in performance of his duty; since game and subsequent interference with arrest by 
warden had identified himself after his suspi- fellow student was not resistance or obstruction 
cions had been aroused, his request to see bait of officer in discharge of duty. State ex rel. 
was not unreasonable and was consistent with Hurley, 28 Utah 2d 248, 501 R2d 111 (1972). 
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889 UTAH RULES Or CRIMiiN/v^ tv.^j^^^^i^ 
jlule 19. Instructions. 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reason-
ably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct the 
< iury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such 
I ^ quests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel 
L^ f its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a 
I ^py of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such in-
fegtructions may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
| (b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court 
|%hall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part 
l^efused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of 
j^ the charge was given and what part was refused. 
- (c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
i therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating dis-
nctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. Not-
ithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions 
\ order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
|E(d). The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court 
ft&fers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the 
Occlusive judges of all questions of fact. 
|&(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
rtxucted the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon 
ae for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
i of submitting, 
ents of offense, 
dure to request or object, 
dew without objection, 
ions, 
[lure to object. 
ficity. 
ae. 
options. 
by jury. 
Be instructions. 
Qtial evidence, 
ats of offense, 
included offenses. 
iity of eyewitness identification. 
|jpr3ict-urging instruction. 
" request. 
tb f submitting. 
i an instruction is submitted by a party, 
Jae party cannot later object to it; he has 
YiWaived any objection and Indorsed it 
flly *ound. State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
fc a party submits more than one in-
& on a single issue, it is reasonable to 
fcsthat one instruction represents that 
jgfpreferred position, while the others rep-
"gHjaekup positions. Therefore, the party 
""nplain when the court uses only one 
_uested instructions. State v. Perdue, 
i',1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
ftte of offense. 
ation instruction is not a substi-
|tea elements instruction. The jury must 
^teted with respect to all the legal ele-
Bat it must find to convict of the crime 
% and the absence of such an instruction 
is reversible error as a matter of law. Failure 
to give the instruction can never be harmless 
error. State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 
1991). 
Even though defendant failed to object to the 
lack of an elements instruction when the in-
structions were given, trial court's complete 
failure to give an elements instruction was 
clear error and required reversal of his convic-
tion and remand for a new trial. State v. Jones, 
823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991). 
Failure to request or object 
Where a defendant does not request an in-
struction on a certain subject, he cannot later 
claim that the trial court's failure to instruct 
on that subject is error. State v. Cowan, 26 
Utah 2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971). 
Except when necessary to avoid manifest in-
justice, this rule prohibits the assigning as 
error the trial court's failure to give a jury in-
struction where no objection is made before the 
jury is instructed. State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 
56 (Utah 1982), overruled on other grounds, 
721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). 
Where oral admissions of defendant in a 
criminal trial are introduced without an in-
struction that such evidence ought to be 
viewed with caution, there is no error as long 
as such an instruction has not been specifically 
requested, especially in a case where the sub-
ject matter is generally covered by the instruc-
tions that are given. State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 
785 (Utah 1984). 
When faced with a claim that a particular 
assertion of instructional error not raised at 
trial should be considered on appeal because 
failure to do so would result in "manifest injus-
tice" under Subdivision (c), the Supreme Court 
will determine whether to review such a claim 
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